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Abstract
In a general Tullock contest, we examine a situation where a limited resource can
be used to provide marginal subsidies to either player (weak or strong), or to increase
the prize directly. We show that to maximize total e¤ort, subsidizing the weak/strong
player is preferred when the contest is su¢ ciently accurate/inaccurate. This result
generalizes to n-player lottery contests. In a lottery contest (Tullock contest with
r = 1), we derive the optimal scheme for a full range of resource: when the resource
is small, it is optimal to only subsidize the weak player; when it is large, both players
should be subsidized simultaneously.
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1 Introduction
A contest is a situation in which players compete against each other by making irreversible
e¤ort, often for a prize or multiple prizes. Many situations in the real world have been studied
as contests or contest situations.1 In practice, setting prizes has been considered as the
most important and e¤ective way to attract potential contestants and stimulate competition
between participants. As a result, prize allocations have been studied extensively in the
contest literature.2
In addition to awarding prizes, subsidizing contestants can also be a good way to induce
e¤ort. This has not drawn much attention in the literature, although in practice subsidies
are often observed in contests or contest situations. By estimating an econometric model
using contractor-level data, Lichtenberg (1990) shows that the US Department of Defense
(DoD) encourages private military R&D investment not only by establishing prizes, but also
by subsidizing expenditures (costs of making e¤ort) dedicated towards winning the prize.3,4
He concludes: On the surface, it appears that the marginal subsidy on the R&D investment
is zero, but this is only true in the short term. Due to the DoDs policy of allowable-cost
determination, the long-run marginal subsidies are substantial.
Similarly, within large rms in sectors where product innovation is of importance, there
may be two or more teams (or individuals) working independently on the same project or
task (e.g., designing next-generation products). The best-performing team will be rewarded
with a prize, such as a bonus or opportunity for promotion. At the same time, the rm would
typically provide resources to reduce the costs of the teams in carrying out their tasks. The
question we address is whether it is better for the rm to provide such a marginal subsidy, or
better to make the prize larger. Other possible applications include education. For instance,
1Contest situations refer to a variety of interactions in reality such as sports, rent-seeking, litigation,
beauty contests, patent races, research and development (R&D), political competition, arms races, etc.
2For instance, Clark and Riis (1998), Moduvanu and Sela (2001), Szymanski and Valletti (2005), Fu and
Lu (2009, 2012), Akerlof and Holden (2012), Schweinzer and Segev (2012) and among others have been
studied prize allocation (or some related issues) within di¤erent settings.
3Lichtenberg (1988) shows that the DoD has conventionally sponsored numerous design competitions to
stimulate private investment in defense technology. R&D contests sponsored by the DoD remain common.
For instance, in 2007, the DoD set a prize of 1 million dollars to lessen the weight of more than 20 pounds
of batteries a solider carries on a typical four-day mission.
4This and other examples have been discussed in Fu, Lu and Lu (2012).
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in a class where students exert e¤ort to achieve higher degree classications, it is common
for a teacher to o¤er marginal help to a student or a specic group of students: the teacher
will o¤er more help when a student exerts more e¤ort.5
The contest designer may face a budget constraint on the resource that can be used as
subsidies. For instance, the DoD or the rm may have a xed amount of money available for
providing subsidies, the teacher may have a xed amount of time for tutoring her students.
Following convention in the contest theory literature where a (xed) prize is often assumed
to have no intrinsic value to the contest designer, we assume that the (limited) resource also
has no intrinsic value to the contest designer.6 Then the problem for the contest designer is:
how can the limited resource be used most e¢ ciently to maximize total e¤ort. For instance,
the DoD, which has the objective of encouraging military R&D in some specic eld, has
to decide which contractor to subsidize, the underdog (the weak rm) or the favorite
(the strong rm); similarly, the rm has to decide which team to subsidize, the strong team
or the weak team; the teacher, who wants to improve the overall academic performance of
her students, may have to decide whether the helpdesk is mainly for helping the less able or
more able students. Moreover, if feasible, would adding the resource directly to the prize be
more e¢ cient than providing subsidies? For example, should the DoD (rm) use the money
to subsidize a contractor (team) or add the money directly to the prize? This paper is an
attempt to answer the above questions.
Our analysis is in the context of Tullock contests.7 Notice that the parameter r in
a Tullock Contest Success Function (CSF), which is often referred to as the discriminatory
power or accuracy level of the contest.8 In this paper, as is common in the literature, Tullock
5For instance, suppose a teacher runs a helpdesk in order to help some students. A student who does
little homework (i.e., makes little e¤ort) will gain little from the helpdesk (i.e., gets little help); while a
student who is well prepared (i.e., makes a large e¤ort) will benet a lot from it (i.e., gets much help).
6While this might often seem unrealistic, focusing on the question of utilizing a xed resource most
e¢ ciently can be regarded as the rst stage in a two-stage process: at the second stage, not analyzed here,
using the cost function (of raising the resource) and the revenue function (of e¤ort) derived from the results
we establish, the optimal amount of the resource can be determined.
7Skaperdas (1996) shows that the Tullock CSF is the only continuous success functional form which
satises several easily interpretable axioms.
8Clark and Riis (1996) show that the Tullock CSF can be interpreted as the outcome of a model in which
each players e¤ort is evaluated with an error where the variance of the error is reected in the parameter
r. This justies the interpretation of r as accuracy of the contest. In particular, Wang (2010) specically
interprets r as the contests accuracy level.
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contests with r = 1 are referred to as lottery contests.
In a general Tullock contest we look at a situation where the contest designer has a
su¢ ciently small amount of resource s to be used to provide marginal subsidies to either
player or to increase the prize directly. We can break the e¤ect of a subsidy into two
components: a direct e¤ect and an indirect e¤ect. For the direct e¤ect the response of the
player being subsidized is that though either player would increase e¤ort if subsidized, the
e¤ect of the subsidy on the recipients e¤ort is greater (smaller) if applied to the stronger
player when r < 1 (r > 1).9 The indirect e¤ect how the other player responds is that
the weak player decreases e¤ort when his opponent is subsidized, while the strong player
increases e¤ort when his opponent is subsidized. We show that the overall e¤ect depends on
the accuracy level of the contest: in order to maximize total e¤ort, subsidizing the strong
player is preferred when the contest is su¢ ciently inaccurate (when r < r), while subsidizing
the weak player is preferred when the contest is su¢ ciently accurate (when r > r). When
the ability di¤erence becomes larger, subsidizing the weak player is more likely to be preferred
(r decreases with the ability di¤erence). Moreover, increasing the prize is always dominated
by the preferred-subsidy-scheme.
Intuitively, from the angle of individual e¢ ciency, the strong player should be subsi-
dized as he is more e¢ cient in exerting e¤ort, which is the main reason why the direct e¤ect
favors subsidizing the strong player when r < 1. However, from the angle of competitive
balance, the weak player should be subsidized as it will make the contest more competitively
balanced and thus stimulates competition, which explain why the strong (weak) player makes
more (less) e¤ort when the weak (strong) player is subsidized. Roughly speaking, when the
contest is su¢ ciently noisy (r < r), the competition is not erce, individual e¢ ciency
outweighs competitive balanceand the strong player should be subsidized. The reverse
occurs when the contest is su¢ ciently accurate (r > r).
In an n-player lottery contest (i.e., a Tullock contest with r = 1), we show that it is
strictly better to subsidize the weakest player, which is in line with our previous nding in
a Tullock contest. In addition, in a two-player lottery contest, we allow s 2 (0;+1) and
derive the optimal scheme that maximizes total e¤ort: when the resource is relatively small
9We model a players strengthby his marginal cost of exerting e¤ort, with the strongplayer referring
to the one with the smaller marginal cost.
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(s  s), it is optimal to only subsidize the weak player, as our earlier results imply; when
the resource is relatively large (s > s), it is optimal to subsidize both players simultaneously.
In our model, providing a marginal subsidy to a player requires that the contest designer
is able to verify the recipients e¤ort level. In cases where e¤ort can be fully veried, theo-
retically, it is easy for the contest designer to construct a simple contract that implements
the maximal individually rational e¤ort and extracts all surplus from the player. Thus, a
contest may be suboptimal.10 One reason why contests with subsidies are used (rather than
contracts) could be that e¤ort itself is not perfectly observable but instead a noisy signal,
such as nal quality of output, is.11 However it may be that some complementary inputs
are observable, and these can be subsidized. For example, the DoDs audits should be able
to verify how much physical investment a rm has made on the research project, which can
be subsidized.12 Finally, it may be that e¤ort is observable but not contractible, so that
contests can be a good way to induce e¤ort. For example, assume the teacher can observe
a students e¤ort with little cost, but a contract between the teacher and a student is not
feasible as e¤ort is not veriable. However, the teacher may be able to commit to o¤ering
help to a student, and the student receives more help the more e¤ort that is exerted for
example the more pieces of work she hands in.
In this paper we focus on linear subsidies. It is straightforward however to show that
non-linear schemes can be more e¤ective in increasing total e¤ort, such as a scheme where
the subsidy is delivered only if a players e¤ort is above some threshold. There are a number
of reasons why we focus on linear subsidies. First, the linear case is a natural benchmark case
that yields sharp results.13 Second, contests with linear subsidies are observed in practice
(see the DoD example discussed above). Third, a linear scheme is likely to be much simpler
to implement.
When the subsidy is linear, the cost of exerting each unit of e¤ort can be subsidized
10Notice that a similar issue arises elsewhere in the literature on contests with subsidies (reimbursements),
e.g., Cohen and Sela (2005), Matros and Armanios (2009), Matros (2012), etc. These papers will be discussed
in the next section on related literature.
11Clark and Riis (1996) show that the Tullock CSF can be interpreted as the outcome of a noisy perfor-
mance ranking model in which each players output consists of an e¤ort term and a noise term. Fu and Lu
(2012) generalize Clark and Riiss (1996) model to a multi-prize case.
12Although the DoD cannot verify how much unobservable e¤ort (e.g., psychic e¤ort) the rm has done,
the incentive to win the contest ensures complementary unobservable e¤ort will be made by the rm.
13As, for example, linear (i.e., piece rate) payment contracts are regularly studied in contract theory.
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according to a pre-specied constant proportion as this e¤ort is being made, regardless of
the previous e¤ort level. However, when a non-linear subsidy scheme is used, the subsidy
for the next unit of e¤ort depends on the current (cumulative) e¤ort level, which may be
di¢ cult to determine, especially when a contestants e¤ort consists of multiple components
that are being made simultaneously.14 An easy way of solving this complication of course is
to provide subsidies when the tournament is over, i.e., when playersnal e¤ort levels are
realized. However this may raise a commitment issue as the contest designer will have an
incentive to renege on any subsidy as e¤ort is sunk. In addition, even without the above
commitment issue, a non-linear subsidy scheme which provide subsides ex post may yield
less e¤ort when the recipients (cost) budget is constrained during the contest.
2 Related Literature
Despite the voluminous literature that has grown from Tullocks (1980) seminal work,15 there
are only a few papers studying contests with subsidies (or reimbursement) in the literature
on imperfectly discriminating contests. Two papers consider lottery contests (i.e., Tullock
contests with r = 1) with full reimbursement: Cohen and Sela (2005) show that if the win-
ners cost of e¤ort is fully reimbursed, there is a unique internal equilibrium where the weak
player wins with the higher probability.16 Matros (2012) analyzes the n-player model and
discusses the properties of the pure-strategy equilibria. In addition, Matros and Armanios
(2009) consider reimbursements in a general17 Tullock contest with homogeneous players
and nd that the winner-reimbursed-contest maximizes net total spending while the loser-
reimbursed-contest minimizes it.18 Notice that in the above papers, contestantsequilibrium
e¤ort levels must be assumed to be common knowledge, otherwise, the contest designer
14For instance, in a research contest such as that sponsored by the DOD, a competing rm may need to
allocate a variety of di¤erent inputs to a project, and determining the order in which these e¤orts are
made in order to fully determine what the current (cumulative) e¤ort level is may be costly or impossible.
15For general surveys of contests, see Nitzan (1994), Szymanski (2003), Corchon (2007), Congleton et al.
(2008) and Konrad (2009).
16The internal equilibrium is such that players strategies are derived from the interior solution that
solves the rst-order conditions. Besides the internal solution, there are corner solutions in which one of the
contestants chooses to stay out of the contest.
17That is, where r can take any value provided a pure-strategy equilibrium exists.
18Kaplan et al. (2002) provide several examples of contests with reimbursements in both politics and
economics.
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cannot provide reimbursements accurately. In this paper, we maintain this assumption.19
Our settings are di¤erent from the above research works mainly in three ways. First,
we consider a Tullock contest with heterogeneous players. Second, in our model a player
is subsidized regardless of who wins eventually, i.e., subsidy is not contingent. Third, we
assume there is a limited amount of resource which can be used for subsidies and we compare
the e¢ ciencies of subsidizing di¤erent players.
Contests with reimbursements have also been studied in the literature on auctions or
perfectly discriminating contests. Riley and Samuelson (1981) introduce the Sad Loser
Auction where the winner gets his bid back. Goeree and O¤erman (2004) analyze the
Amsterdam auction in which the highest losing bidder obtains a premium which depends
on his own bid. Clark and Riis (2000) show that an o¢ cial who obtains bribes (e¤ort)
from rms (players) will favor the rm who is more likely to value the prize less. Che and
Gale (2003) show that imposing a bidding cap on the strong player better incentivizes both
players. Kirkegaard (2012) shows that it is generally protable to give the weak player a
head start.
Thus the existing auction literature suggests that the underdog should be subsidized in
order to improve the competitive balance, which in turn increases e¤ort. Our nding that it
is better to subsidize the underdog (the weak player) when the contest is su¢ ciently accurate
(when r > r), is consistent with the conventional wisdom. However, we also show that this
does not carry over when accuracy is low: when the contest is su¢ ciently inaccurate(when
r < r), the strong player should be subsidized.
Fu, Lu and Lu (2012) study the optimal design of R&D contests where the contest
designer can split his budget between a prize and e¢ ciency-enhancing (lump-sum) subsidies
to the rms. Although we look at similar questions, they adopt a framework where the
quality of a rms product is randomly drawn from a distribution inuenced by rms research
capacity and labor input, which is a very di¤erent context than the canonical Tullock setting
that we consider.20 Despite the distinctive technical di¤erences, some insights of the two
19At the end of Section 1, we discuss situations in which this assumption is reasonable.
20Fu and Lu (2012) assume the contest organizer can decrease a players marginal cost by a given amount
by making a lump-sum payment, i.e., this is e¤ectively a change to the technology and it costs the contest
designer the same no matter what his e¤ort level is. By contrast, in our model the contest designer can
only reimburse a player in proportion to her total cost (i.e., provide a marginal subsidy), so that it costs the
contest designer more when the recipient exerts a larger e¤ort.
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papers correspond. They nd that in the optimally designed contest, the sponsor may favor
the strong rm when the innovation process involves substantial di¢ culty or uncertainty.
Analogously, we nd that when the contest is su¢ ciently inaccurate, subsidizing the strong
player is preferred.21
3 The Tullock Contest Model
3.1 The Two-player Model
There are two risk-neutral players involved in a contest with a single prize V . Player i,
(i = 1; 2), has a linear cost function, ci(ei) = ci  ei, where ei refers to player is e¤ort level
and ci > 0 is player is marginal cost of making e¤ort. Denoting c := c2=c1, assume player
1 is more able than player 2, i.e., c > 1. The probability of winning is determined by the
following Tullock CSF:22 In a contest with n contestants, an arbitrary player i wins the prize
with probability
Pi(ei; e i) =
8><>:
eriPn
j=1 e
r
j
if maxfe1; :::eng > 0;
1=n if maxfe1; :::eng = 0,
(1)
where ei refers to player is e¤ort level and e i = (e1; e2; :::ei 1; ei+1; :::; en) represents the
other n   1 playerse¤ort choices. The parameter r in (1), r > 0, which is often referred
to as the discriminatory power, can also be interpreted as the accuracy level of the contest.
All the parameters, i.e., r, c1 and c2, are common knowledge. Each player maximizes his
expected utility i where i = Pi(ei; e i)V   ciei, and has an outside option of zero. Assume
that the total e¤ort-maximizing contest designer allocates a xed amount of resource s to
be used to subsidize either player or simply to increase the prize.
Nti (1999) analyzes a model with heterogeneous valuations (V1  V2) and homogeneous
abilities (c1 = c2 = 1). With linear cost functions, there is a close one-to-one relationship
between di¤erences in valuations and di¤erences in abilities (i.e., marginal costs). Due to the
technical equivalence between heterogeneous valuations and heterogeneous abilities, Wang
(2010) obtains the following results from Nti (1999), which we restate as follows:
21However, some results di¤er due to the di¤erent settings of the two models. We show that the contest
designer always prefers using the resource available on subsidies rather than on increasing the prize, while
they show that subsidies should decrease and the prize increase if the innovation process is less challenging.
22We present the general version to avoid repetition later.
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Lemma 1 Without subsidies, there exists a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium for any
r 2 (0; r], where r satises cr = 1=(r   1), with r decreasing from 2 to 1 as c increases from
1 to +1. The equilibrium e¤ort levels are:
e1 =
cr1c
r
2rV
c1(cr1 + c
r
2)
2
; e2 =
cr1c
r
2rV
c2(cr1 + c
r
2)
2
; TE =
(c1 + c2)c
r 1
1 c
r 1
2 rV
(cr1 + c
r
2)
2
, (2)
where TE := e1 + e2 denotes total e¤ort.
Proof. See Appendix.23
The contest designer has resource s to be allocated to subsidizing players e¤orts or
to increasing the prize. We focus on the case that when subsidizing a player, a certain
proportion of his cost will be covered by the contest designer regardless of who wins the
contest. That is, we restrict attention to a linear subsidy scheme. This form of subsidy
is referred to as a marginal subsidy in this paper. Henceforth in this section we restrict
attention to (interior) values of r such that pure-strategy equilibria exist, r 2 (0; r); that is,
we rule out r large.24
The timing of the model is as follows. Firstly, the contest designer announces her subsidy
policy publicly: which player will be subsidized and the level of the marginal subsidy for
the recipient, i.e., what percentage of the recipients cost will be subsidized (or reimbursed).
We assume that the resource has no intrinsic value to the contest designer who aims to
maximize the total e¤ort. The contest designer can choose either player to subsidize, or if
she chooses to subsidize neither player, all the resource will be added directly to the prize.
Secondly, given the contest designers subsidy policy, the two players make their one-shot
e¤ort decisions simultaneously in a Tullock contest. Lastly, the contest designer fullls his
commitment as previously announced.
Next, we compare the e¢ ciency of subsidizing one of the two players. Suppose only the
strong player is subsidized, so his marginal cost decreases from c1 to c01 and he makes an
e¤ort e01 in the new equilibrium. Since the total amount of subsidies must be equal to the
23Though Lemma 1 can be derived straightforwardly from Nti (1999), a proof is provided for completeness.
24Alcalde and Dahm (2010) and Wang (2010) show that for su¢ ciently large r such that pure-strategy
equilibria do not exist, mixed-strategy equilibria exist. We leave the analysis of such equilibria for future
research.
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resource that the contest designer possesses,25 we have
s = (c1   c01)e01, where e01 =
c0r1 c
r
2rV
c01(c
0r
1 + c
r
2)
2
: (3)
Alternatively, the contest designer may use s to subsidize the weak player, whose marginal
cost of making e¤ort decreases from c2 to c02, so that
s = (c2   c02)e02, where e02 =
cr1c
0r
2 rV
c02(c
r
1 + c
0r
2 )
2
: (4)
It should be stressed that in the above, e0i, 8i 2 f1; 2g, is player is equilibrium e¤ort given
the two playersnet of subsidy marginal costs. One issue may be that it is impossible for the
designer to deliver on his promises of a marginal subsidy o¤ the equilibrium path if there
are no extra resources available. For example, when player 1 is being subsidized, if player 1
exerts more e¤ort than e01, the contest designer will run out of resources. This concern can
be eliminated by simply setting a total subsidy cap s so no more subsidy is provided when
e01 is exceeded. Alternatively we can assume that he has other resources available, but only
chooses to allocate s; in equilibrium, to the contest.26
We can show that for small s; whichever player i is subsidized, a unique pure-strategy
equilibrium continues to exist in which all of s is allocated to player i:
Lemma 2 Given r 2 (0; r), if the contest designer subsidizes player i, i 2 f1; 2g, then for
s > 0 su¢ ciently small there exists a unique pure-strategy equilibrium with c0i satisfying (3)
if i = 1 or (4) if i = 2. Moreover c0i is strictly decreasing in s in this range.
Proof. See Appendix.
In view of this result, we can, for s in a neighborhood of 0; write ci (s) in place of c0i to
be the cost for player i when subsidies s are devoted to player i, and where ci (0) = ci. By
implicit di¤erentiation of (3) and (4):
dci (s)
ds
js=0 =  

1
ei

; i 2 f1; 2g: (5)
25We will verify that this is both feasible and desirable below.
26If indeed s is a choice variable for the designer, our analysis can be viewed as the solution to the rst stage
of a two-stage process where the optimal impact of a given level of s is determined, and at the second-stage
the level of s is optimized.
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Thus, from (2) we get that at s = 0,
dc1 (s)
ds
=
dc2 (s)
ds
=
e2
e1
=
c1
c2
: (6)
To compare impacts on total e¤ort by subsidizing either player, at s = 0; write
dTES
ds
=
dTEW
ds
=

dTE
dc1
=
dTE
dc2

dc1 (s)
ds
=
dc2 (s)
ds

; (7)
where superscripts S andW on TE indicate that we are considering cases where the subsidy
is given to the strong or the weak player, respectively. In the Appendix, using (2), (6), we
further write (7) as a function of c and r, and obtain the following results.
Proposition 1 For s su¢ ciently small,27 (i) in order to maximize total e¤ort,it is better to
subsidize the weak player rather than the strong player when r > r; and the strong player
should be subsidized when 0 < r < r since,
dTES
ds
js=0 <;> dTE
W
ds
js=0 when r >;< r;
where r satises
cr
   2r
(c+ 1) + (c  1)
2r(c+ 1)  (c  1) = 0; (8)
(ii) r < 1 and is decreasing in c.
Proof. See Appendix.
An alternative way of increasing total e¤ort is to add the resource s directly to the prize.
If the contest designer adds s to the prize, using (2) we have
dTEP
ds
=
(c1 + c2)c
r 1
1 c
r 1
2 r
(cr1 + c
r
2)
2
; (9)
where superscript P refers to the case when adding s to the prize.
By analyzing dTE
S
ds
=dTE
P
ds
and dTE
W
ds
=dTE
P
ds
, the following result can be obtained.
Proposition 2 For s su¢ ciently small, in order to maximize total e¤ort, subsidizing the
strong player is preferred to increasing the prize when 0 < r < 1; subsidizing the weak player
is preferred to increasing the prize when r  1.
27When s is su¢ ciently small, it is su¢ cient to rank the derivatives dTE
X
ds where X = S;W;P; since
TEX0  TE + sdTEXds . Here P denotes the case, considered below, where s is used to increase the prize.
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Proof. See Appendix.
Propositions 1 and 2 imply our main conclusion:
Corollary 1 In order to maximize total e¤ort, among the three options of using a small
amount of resource s (i.e., subsidizing the weak player, subsidizing the strong player or
increasing the prize), subsidizing the strong player dominates the other two options when
0 < r < r, while subsidizing the weak player dominates the other two options when r > r.28
3.2 Discussion
We discuss the relative benets of subsidizing either the weak or the strong player, which
will give some intuition behind the results of the previous subsection. There is both a direct
and an indirect e¤ect of subsidizing a player. First, the direct e¤ect. From (2), the following
can be easily derived:
de1
dc1
< 0;
de2
dc2
< 0; (10)
de1
dc2
< 0;
de2
dc1
> 0: (11)
Inequalities (10) indicate that subsidizing either player will induce that player to exert more
e¤ort.29 Intuitively: subsidizing a player e¤ectively means he is more able as his marginal
cost decreases; thus he will exert more e¤ort in equilibrium. To see whether the weak or the
strong player responds more when being subsidized, we have that at s = 0:
deS1
ds
=
deW2
ds
=

de1
dc1
=
de2
dc2

dc1
ds
=
dc2
ds

=

de1
dc1
=
de2
dc2

1
c

; (12)
where superscripts S and W on e1 and e2 indicate that we are considering cases where the
subsidy is given to the strong or the weak player, respectively. By analyzing (12), we obtain
the following result.
Proposition 3 (i) It can be shown that
de1
dc1
=
de2
dc2
> 1
28Since from (9) dTEP =ds > 0, it follows that the optimal scheme, which is by denition at least as good,
also delivers a local increase in aggregate e¤ort and hence it is optimal to use all of s when s is small.
29This is the equilibrium response of the player who is subsidized.
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and this ratio is decreasing in r; (ii) It can be further shown that
deS1
ds
js=0 >;=; < de
W
2
ds
js=0 when r <;=; > 1:
Proof. See Appendix.
The fact that the strong player exerts more e¤ort in equilibrium implies that the subsidy
goes less far in reducing c1 this is reected by the term (1=c) in (12), which was derived in
(6): at s = 0,
dc1
ds
=
dc2
ds
=
1
c
:
However by Proposition 3 (i), a given cut in marginal cost has a larger impact on the strong
player. Moreover when r < 1, this is su¢ cient to outweigh that there is a smaller reduction
in c1, but not when r > 1, which is expressed in Proposition 3 (ii).
Inequalities (11) show the indirect e¤ect. The weak player reduces e¤ort when the strong
player is subsidized; by contrast, the strong player exerts more e¤ort when the weak player is
subsidized. Intuitively, we can think of the weak player as shrinking from ercer competition
as the strong opponent gets stronger, while the strong player competes more as the weak
opponent gets stronger. In sum, the direct e¤ect favors subsidizing the strong player when
r < 1 and the indirect e¤ect always favors subsidizing the weak player.
When r is su¢ ciently low (i.e., 0 < r < r), the direct e¤ect of a subsidy to the strong
player is large enough, despite the o¤setting negative indirect e¤ect on the weak player, to
dominate subsidizing the weak player. For r  1, the direct e¤ect of subsidizing the weak
player is greater (or the same when r = 1) from Proposition 3. Since the indirect e¤ect also
goes the same way, subsidizing the weak player is preferable. For r < r < 1, although the
direct e¤ect on the strong player is larger, the indirect e¤ects o¤set this and subsidizing the
weak player remains optimal. Moreover, r decreasing with c indicates that as the ability
di¤erence becomes larger, subsidizing the weak player is more likely to be preferred.
Roughly speaking, the contest designer has to take into account the following two issues
when subsidizing a player. First, from the angle of individual e¢ ciency, the strong player
should be subsidized as he is more e¢ cient in exerting e¤ort per se, which is the main reason
why the direct e¤ect favors subsidizing the strong player when r < 1. Secondly, from the
12
angle of competitive balance, the weak player should be subsidized as it makes the contest
more evenly balanced and thus stimulates competition, which explains why his opponent
makes more (less) e¤ort when the weak (strong) player is subsidized.
When the contest is su¢ ciently noisy (r < r), the competition between players is not
so intense, and the benet from individual e¢ ciency outweighs the loss from competitive
balance, so the strong player should be subsidized; while when the contest is more accurate
(r > r), competition between players is more intense, and the benet from competitive
balance outweighs the loss from individual e¢ ciency, so the weak player should be subsidized.
3.3 With Symmetric Players
In the previous analysis with asymmetric players, we analyzed the two-player case with
resource s small. In this subsection, we look at a model with n players when a full range of
resource s is allowed, i.e., s 2 (0;+1), but with symmetric players.
In an n-player Tullock contest model where every players marginal cost of exerting e¤ort
is c, i.e., c1 = c2 = ::: = cn = c; with CSF given by (1), when r  rn := nn 1 a pure-strategy
equilibrium can be shown to exist. In the following analysis, we focus on two situations
assuming r  rn: First, the resource s is used as additional prize; second, s is used to
provide equal marginal subsidies to all players.
When the resource s is used to supplement the prize, it can be shown that in the pure-
strategy equilibrium, each player is e¤ort level satises
ePi =

n  1
n2

r(V + s)
c
: (13)
When the resource s is used to subsidize each player equally, in equilibrium each player i
receives s=n as subsidies:
s
n
= (c  c0)e0i, where e0i =

n  1
n2

rV
c0
: (14)
Thus
e0i =
(n  1)rV + ns
n2c
: (15)
As rn = nn 1 , (15) can be rewritten as
e0i =

n  1
n2

rV + rns
c
: (16)
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When a pure-strategy equilibrium exists, r  rn, and clearly ePi  e0i as RHS of (13) 
RHS of (16): allocating s to the prize is strictly dominated by subsidizing players (evenly)
unless r = rn.30 ;31 It is straightforward to show that any split allocation of the resource s
between prize and subsidy is dominated by allocating s entirely as subsidy. We summarize
the above result in the following proposition:
Proposition 4 With n symmetric players, for r such that a pure strategy equilibrium exists
(r  rn), allocating any of the resource s as an additional prize is dominated by using s
entirely as an equal subsidy for all players.
The above result also implies that, with symmetric players, if the original prize V can
be partially allocated as subsidies, then the contest designer has an incentive to reallocate
resources from the prize to subsidies to the maximum extent possible. In fact a players
expected equilibrium payo¤ would approach zero as V ! 0 and each player is almost fully
subsidized, with e¤ort being so large that rent is almost fully dissipated by the contest
designer. In practice however the contest prize is not usually completely divisible and cannot
be fully or even partially reallocated as subsidies, as for example with the contract o¤ered
by the DoD, or higher exam grades o¤ered by a school.
4 The Lottery Contest Model
In a setting of a general Tullock contest,32 analytical tractability restricted our preceding
analysis to the two-player case with resource s being su¢ ciently small (and the n-player case
with symmetric players). In this section we look at lottery contests (i.e., Tullock contests
with r = 1) which are the most widely studied special cases of Tullock contests. This
setting allows us to analyze the following two situations: the n-player model (n  2) and
the two-player model with s 2 (0;+1).
30When r = rn, in the pure-strategy equilibrium each players expected payo¤ is zero regardless of the
value of the prize, i.e., the rent is fully dissipated.
31This analysis can straightforwardly accommodate nonlinear e¤ort costs. Suppose the cost function takes
the form cei ,  > 0. Dene er = r=. Note that pure-strategy equilibria exist when er  rn. We would have
that allocating s to the prize is strictly dominated when er < rn, and they are equivalent when er = rn in
which case each players expected payo¤ is zero.
32As mentioned earlier, here we add general in the sense that r can take any value provided a pure-
strategy equilibrium exists.
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4.1 The N-player Lottery Contest Model
We consider a model with n risk-neutral contestants in a contest with a single prize V , where
the CSF is the Tullock CSF (1) with r = 1. Assume player is marginal cost of making e¤ort
ei is ci. The contestants are asymmetric in the sense that 0 < c1  c2  :::  cn and c1 < cn.
Player 1 (whose marginal cost is c1) is the most ableplayer and player n (whose marginal
cost is cn) is the least able. Assume we start with an equilibrium with no subsidy and all
players participating in the contest with strictly positive e¤orts.
Player is expected prot is i = Pi(ei; e i)V   ciei, where Pi(ei; e i) is given by (1) with
r = 1. The rst order condition for player i is
di
dei
=
V
P
j 6=i ej
(ei +
P
j 6=i ej)
2
  ci = 0. (17)
It can be veried that the second-order condition for d2i=de2i is satised for any n  2.
Lemma 3 (i) 33 In the n-player model, total e¤ort is
TE Pni=1 ei = V (n  1)Pn
i=1 ci
; (18)
(ii) For any two players, player p and player q, with cp < cq, it must be the case that ep > eq,
i.e., the more able the player is, the more e¤ort he exerts in equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix.
As in the two-player model, suppose the contest designer has a small amount of resource
s which can be used to subsidize any player or increase the prize directly. For any two players
p and q with cp < cq in the initial equilibrium with no subsidy, their e¤ort levels are eq < ep.
When player p is subsidized, his marginal cost decreases from cp to c0p, and he exerts new
e¤ort level e0p. The total amount of subsidies must be equal to the resource that the contest
designer has available, i.e.,
s = (cp   c0p)e0p = cpe0p:
Likewise when player q is subsidized,
s = (cq   c0q)e0q = cqe0q:
33The result in (i) has been derived in Stein (2002) and Ritz (2008). The uniqueness of equilibrium in
asymmetric contests is established by Matros (2006).
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Thus cpe0p = s = cqe
0
q, which implies that cp < cq as for small s;
e0p  ep > eq  e0q:
From (18), we can see that in equilibrium the total e¤ort only depends on the sum of the
marginal costs, i.e.,
Pn
i=1 ci. Therefore, regardless of who is being subsidized, the contest
designer only cares about the change of the recipients marginal cost. Thus, subsidizing a
less able player (player q) yields a larger total e¤ort than subsidizing a more able player
(player p) as cp < cq. Hence it is optimal to subsidize the weakest player to maximize
the total e¤ort.
In the Appendix, we also show that subsidizing the weakest player is more e¤ective in
increasing total e¤ort than increasing the prize. We summarize the ndings in the following
proposition.34
Proposition 5 For su¢ ciently small s, to maximize total e¤ort: (i) subsidizing the weakest
player (among players who are willing to make strictly positive e¤orts) is more e¢ cient than
subsidizing any other player; (ii) subsidizing the weakest player is also more e¢ cient than
adding the resource to the prize.
Proof. See Appendix for the proof of (ii).
The above result is in line with our previous nding in a general Tullock contest model:
when r = 1, subsidizing the weak player is more e¤ective in increasing total e¤ort than
subsidizing the strong player or increasing the prize.
4.2 The Two-player Lottery Contest Model with s 2 (0;+1)
In this model, we allow for s large and divisible, so that, for instance, it is possible to
subsidize both players simultaneously.
Assume that the contest designer uses s1 and s2 to simultaneously subsidize player 1 and
player 2 respectively, and also adds sP to the prize at the same time, where s1+ s2+ sP  s.
We seek to nd the optimal allocation of s1, s2 and sP that maximizes total e¤ort.
34The argument that all of s should be expended when s is small is as discussed above in the general
two-player case.
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After being subsidized simultaneously, player 1s marginal cost decreases from c1 to c01,
and player 2s marginal cost decreases from c2 to c02. Let e
0
1 and e
0
2 denote player 1 and 2s
e¤ort levels after being subsidized respectively and let TE 0 = e01 + e
0
2. Thus, using (2) the
following must hold:
s1 = (c1   c01)e01; s2 = (c2   c02)e02, (19)
where
e01 =
c02(V + sP )
(c01 + c
0
2)
2
; e02 =
c01(V + sP )
(c01 + c
0
2)
2
: (20)
From (19) and (20), we get
s1 = (c1   c01)
c02(V + sP )
(c01 + c
0
2)
2
; (21)
s2 = (c2   c02)
c01(V + sP )
(c01 + c
0
2)
2
: (22)
It is straightforward (but tedious) to establish that for given values of c1, c2, V and s, for
every possible allocation (s1; s2; sP ) 2 R3+ of the resource s where s1 + s2 + sP  s, there
exists a pair (c01; c
0
2) that is the unique solution to the system of equations (21) and (22).
35
This (c01; c
0
2) then corresponds to the unique pure-strategy equilibrium associated with the
allocation (s1; s2; sP ).36 Dening
c1 := c1   c01 and c2 := c2   c02;
then by (19) and (20),
s1 + s2 = c1e
0
1 +c2e
0
2; (23)
TE 0 =
V + sP
c1 + c2  c1  c2 : (24)
It is straightforward to see that it is optimal to use the entire resource to maximize total
e¤ort. Suppose otherwise, i.e., that total e¤ort is maximized by using a smaller resource
s^ < s. But then increasing the prize will further increase e¤ort, so using only s^ cannot be
optimal,37 and it follows that all of s will be used.
35It can be checked that the Jacobian determinant of the system of equations (21) and (22) with respect
to c01 and c
0
2 is always non-zero for positive subsidies so this solution is also di¤erentiable in subsidies by the
Implicit Function Theorem.
36By the logic of Footnote 33.
37Consider, starting from s1 + s2 + sP = s^ < s a small increase in the prize holding c01 and c
0
2 constant.
From (20) e01 and e
0
2 are continuous increasing functions of sP so will increase by small amounts, implying
that e¤ort increases, but the change in s1 + s2 is also small from (19) so total spending will remain below s
and the change is feasible. That total e¤ort increases contradicts the assumed initial optimality.
17
In the Appendix, we establish the following result.
Proposition 6 In order to maximize total e¤ort, (i) when s  s, where
s =
2(c  1)V
(3 + c)2
; (25)
it is optimal to use all the resource s to subsidize the weak player; (ii) when s > s, it is
optimal to use all the resource to subsidize both players simultaneously. Increasing the prize
is always dominated.
Proof. See Appendix.
Our analysis in section 2 showed that for the case r = 1, when s is su¢ ciently small,
subsidizing the weak player always dominates. Proposition 6 (i) shows that this result
continues to hold when the resource is larger so long as s  s.38
In our previous analysis with s being su¢ ciently small, we only needed to compare the
marginal e¤ects of the three options (i.e., subsidizing the strong/weak player or adding
to the prize), and devote all the resource to the option that induces the largest marginal
increase in total e¤ort. But for larger resource it is possible that using two or three options
simultaneously may dominate using a single option. Proposition 6 (ii) indicates that for
higher values of s (s > s), the strong player is also subsidized, but the prize is never increased.
Subsidizing the strong player becomes optimal as subsidizing just the weaker player would
create a competitive imbalance.
5 Concluding Comments
This paper has examined a situation where the contest designer has a limited amount of
resource s which can be used to provide marginal subsidies or to directly increase the prize.
In a two-player Tullock model, we show that it is optimal to subsidize the strong (weak)
player when the contest is noisy (accurate). Intuitively, from the point of view of individual
e¢ ciency, the strong player should be subsidized as he is more e¢ cient in exerting e¤ort.
However, considering competitive balance, the weak player should be subsidized as it will
make the contest more evenly balanced, which in turn stimulates competition and e¤ort.
38For example, our numerical analysis shows that when c (= c2=c1) = 3, s = 0:11V .
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When the contest is noisy (r < r), competition is not intense and individual e¢ ciency
outweighs competitive balanceand the strong player should be subsidized. The reverse
occurs when the contest is fairly accurate (r > r), i.e., the weak player should be subsidized.
In a n-player lottery contest (i.e., Tullock contest with r = 1), we show that, to maxi-
mize total e¤ort, it is optimal to subsidize the weakest player, which is consistent with our
previous ndings in a general Tullock contest. Moreover, in a two-player lottery contest, we
characterize the optimal scheme for all possible values of s 2 (0;+1): as our results in a
general Tullock contest imply, when s is small (s < s), it is optimal to only subsidize the
weak player; while when s is large (s > s), both players should be subsidized simultaneously;
but again, increasing the prize is always dominated.
Although we considered lottery contests for a general case with n players and s 2 (0;+1),
our analysis of a general Tullock contest was restricted to the two-player case with resource
s being su¢ ciently small. Despite the seeming technical di¢ culties, an analysis in a general
Tullock contest with more than two players and a full range of resource where s 2 (0;+1),
and further analysis of the optimal subsidy scheme within other model settings, merit further
study.
6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Lemma 1
The expected revenue for contestants 1 and 2 are:
L1 =
er1V
er1 + e
r
2
  c1e1; L2 = e
r
2V
er1 + e
r
2
  c2e2: (26)
Assume there exists a pure-strategy equilibrium where contestants 1 and 2 make e¤orts e1
and e2 respectively. First order conditions require
@L1
@e1
je1=e1;e2=e2 = 0;
@L2
@e2
je1=e1;e2=e2 = 0;
which implies
er1 e
r
2 rV = c1e

1(e
r
1 + e
r
2 )
2; er1 e
r
2 rV = c2e

2(e
r
1 + e
r
2 )
2: (27)
Solving (27), we have
e1 =
cr1c
r
2rV
c1(cr1 + c
r
2)
2
; e2 =
cr1c
r
2rV
c2(cr1 + c
r
2)
2
. (28)
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To ensure the existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium, all contestants participation
constraints must hold; substituting (28) into (26), we require:
L1je1=e1; e2=e2 =
(1  cr(r   1))V
(1 + cr)2
 0;
L2je1=e1; e2=e2 =
cr(1 + cr   r)V
(1 + cr)2
 0:
Thus,
L1je1=e1; e2=e2  0, cr  r   1; (29)
L2je1=e1; e2=e2  0, cr(r   1)  1: (30)
When r  1, we have cr(r   1)  1 and cr  r   1. So when r  1, the equilibrium always
exists. When r > 1, a necessary and su¢ cient condition for the equilibrium to exist, by (29)
and (30), is:
r   1  cr  1
r   1 . (31)
A necessary condition for (31) is r  2, otherwise r  1 > 1=(r  1). When r  2, we always
have r   1  cr. So we only need focus on cr  1=(r   1). When r > 1, cr is increasing
in r and 1=(r   1) is decreasing in r, so we need r  r, where r satises cr = 1=(r   1).
In summary, to ensure playersparticipation constraints hold, we need 0  r  r, where r
satises cr = 1=(r  1). It is easily checked that when c increases from 1 to +1, r decreases
from 2 to 1.
Next we want to show that the second order conditions hold at equilibrium when e1 = e1,
e2 = e

2. For player 1,
d2L1
de21
je1=e1; e2=e2 =  
er2 e
 2+r
1 rV
(er1 + e
r
2 )
3
[(r + 1)er1   (r   1)er2 ]
Notice that (27) implies that er1 = (c2=c1)e
r
2 = ce
r
2 , so
d2L1
de21
je1=e1; e2=e2 =  
er2 rV e
 2+r
1
(er1 + e
r
2 )
3
[(r + 1)(ce2)
r   (r   1)er2 ]
=  rV e
 2+r
1 e
2r
2
(er1 + e
r
2 )
3
[(r + 1)cr   (r   1)]:
As [(r + 1)cr   (r   1)] > 1 + r + 1  r > 0, we have
d2L2
de22
je1=e1; e2=e2 < 0.
For player 2,
d2L2
de22
je1=e1; e2=e2 =
er1 e
 2+2r
2 rV
(er1 + e
r
2 )
3
[cr(r   1))  (r + 1)]:
As (30) implies cr(r   1)  1, cr(r   1)  (r + 1) < 0, and we have
d2L2
de22
je1=e1; e2=e2 < 0.
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6.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Suppose the contest designer subsidizes the strong player, and consider the following (see
(3)):
s = g(c01) :=
(c1   c01)c0r 11 cr2rV
(c0r1 + c
r
2)
2
: (32)
From (32), we get
dg(c01)
dc01
=
c0r 21 c
r
2r[c1c
r
2(r   1)  c01r(cr2   c0r1 )  c1c0r1 (r + 1)]V
(c0r1 + c
r
2)
3
: (33)
If r  1, dg(c01)=dc01 < 0 as c1cr2(r   1)  0 and  c01r(cr2   c0r1 )   c1c0r1 (r + 1) < 0. If r > 1,
then as by assumption r < r, and by denition cr = 1=(r   1), we get
cr <
1
r   1 ;
which by c := c2=c1 further implies cr2(r   1) < cr1; thus we get
dg(c01)
dc01
jc01=c1 <
cr 21 c
r
2r[c1c
r
1   c1r(cr2   cr1)  c1cr1(r + 1)]V
(cr1 + c
r
2)
3
=
cr 21 c
r
2r[ c1r(cr2   cr1)  c1cr1r]V
(cr1 + c
r
2)
3
< 0.
Thus by the implicit function theorem for s in a neighbourhood of 0 there exists a unique c01
that satises (32) (as a di¤erentiable function of s), and in particular for s > 0 su¢ ciently
small and dening c0 := c2=c01, c
0 is arbitrarily close to c, so we can choose s small enough so
that r0 which solves (c0)r
0
= 1=(r0   1) is close to r (the upper bound without subsidies by
Lemma 1), and in particular r 2 (0; r0]. By Lemma 1 this guarantees that a pure-strategy
equilibrium exists for all s small enough and dg(c1)=dc01 < 0 implies that c
0
1 is decreasing in
s.
Likewise when the contest designer subsidizes the weak player, from (4),
s = g(c02) :=
(c2   c02)cr1c0r 12 rV
(cr1 + c
0r
2 )
2
: (34)
From (34) we get
dg(c02)
dc02
=  c
0r 2
2 c
r
1r[c
0r
2 (c2 + c2r   c02r) + cr1(c2   c2r + c02r)]V
(c0r1 + c
r
2)
3
: (35)
If r  1, then dg(c02)=dc02 < 0 as c0r2 (c2 + c2r   c02r) > 0 and c2   c2r + c02r > 0. If r > 1, as
shown above, cr2(r   1) < cr1; thus we get
dg(c02)
dc02
jc02=c2 <  
cr 22 c
r
1r[c
r
2(c2 + c2r   c2r) + cr2(r   1)(c2   c2r + c2r)]V
(cr1 + c
r
2)
3
=  c
2r 1
2 c
r
1r
2V
(cr1 + c
r
2)
3
< 0:
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Then by analogous reasoning to the above case with the strong player being subsidized,
for s in a neighbourhood of 0 there exists a unique c02 that satises (34) (as a di¤erentiable
decreasing function of s), and such that a pure-strategy equilibrium exists.
6.3 Proof of Proposition 1
From the expression for TE in (2), we get
dTE
dc1
=
cr 21 c
r 1
2 fcr2[c2(r   1) + c1r]  cr1[c2 + (c1 + c2)r]grV
(cr1 + c
r
2)
3
; (36)
dTE
dc2
=
cr 11 c
r 2
2 fcr1[c1(r   1) + c2r]  cr2[c1 + (c1 + c2)r]grV
(cr1 + c
r
2)
3
: (37)
Substituting (6), (36) and (37) into (7), we derive that at s = 0,
dTES
ds
=
dTEW
ds
=
[c+ (1 + c)r]  cr[c(r   1) + r]
cr[1 + (1 + c)r]  [(r   1) + cr] : (38)
From (38), it can be derived that
dTES
ds
js=0 >;< dTE
W
ds
js=0
if and only if f(r) >;< 0, where
f(r) := [c+ (1 + c)r]  cr[c(r   1) + r]  cr[1 + (1 + c)r] + [(r   1) + cr]
= 2r(c+ 1) + (c  1)  cr[2r(c+ 1)  (c  1)]: (39)
It is straightforward to see that f(r) > 0 when 2r(c + 1)  (c  1)  0, i.e., f(r) > 0 when
r  (c  1)=2(c+1). It can also be proved that f(r) < 0 when r  1. This is because at the
point r = 1, f(r) = 1  c2 < 0 and
df(r)
dr
=   [2(1 + c)(cr   1) + cr(1  c+ 2(1 + c)r) log(c)] < 0: (40)
Therefore, we have shown that f(r) > 0 when r  (c 1)=2(c+1) and f(r) < 0 when r  1.
What is f (r) when (c  1)=2(c+1) < r < 1? Using (39), we can show that f = 2(c  1) > 0
when r = (c 1)=2(c+1) and f < 0 when r = 1. Using (40), we get that df(r)=dr < 0 when
(c  1)=2(c+1) < r < 1, i.e., f(r) is strictly decreasing when r increases. Thus, we conclude
that there must exist a r where f(r) = 0 and (c   1)=2(c + 1) < r < 1. It follows that
when r > r, f(r) < 0; and when r < r, f(r) > 0.
Because of f(c; r) = 0 (adding c as an explicit argument to f) we have
dr
dc
=  

@f
@c
=
@f
@r

: (41)
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It is simple to derive that
@f
@r
=   2(1 + c)(cr   1) + cr(1  c+ 2(1 + c)r) log(c) < 0 (42)
and
@f
@c
= 2r + 1  cr 1[2(1 + c)r2 + (1 + c)r   c]: (43)
Since f(r) = 0, from (39) we have
cr

=
2r(c+ 1) + (c  1)
2r(c+ 1)  (c  1) : (44)
Substituting (44) into (43), we have
@f
@c
=  r

4r2(c+ 1)2   (c  1)2   8c
c[(1  c) + 2(1 + c)r]

:
Since (1  c) + 2(1 + c)r > 0, @f=@c < 0 if and only if
4r2(c+ 1)2   (c  1)2   8c > 0;
i.e., r >
p
8c+ (c  1)2
2(c+ 1)
= er: (45)
Substituting er into (39), we can show that f(er) > 0 for all c > 0. It must be the case that
r > er since f(er) > f(r) = 0 and df=dr < 0. Thus, @f=@c < 0. Therefore,
dr
dc
=  

@f
@c
=
@f
@r

< 0.
We have shown that r decreases when c increases. By numerical analysis, we can derive
that r  0:708 when c! 1 and r  0:5 when c! +1.
6.4 Proof of Proposition 2
If the contest designer subsidizes the weak player, using (5) we have
dTEW
ds
js=0 = dTE
dc2

dc2
ds

=
dTE
dc2

  1
e2

: (46)
Substituting the expression of e2 in (2) and (37) into (46),
dTEW
ds
js=0 = c
r
2[c1 + (c1 + c2)r]  cr1[c1(r   1) + c2r]
c1c2(cr1 + c
r
2)
: (47)
Using (9) and (47), we get at s = 0,
dTEW
ds
=
dTEP
ds
=

1 +
cr + 1  (1 + c)r
cr(1 + c)r

(1 + cr). (48)
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Moreover, to compare the e¤ect of adding s to the prize with that of subsidizing the strong
player, we have:
dTES
ds
=
dTEP
ds
=

dTES
ds
=
dTEW
ds

dTEW
ds
=
dTEP
ds

: (49)
Substituting (38) and (48) into (49), we derive that at s = 0,
dTES
ds
=
dTEP
ds
=

1 +
c  cr[r   c(1  r)]
(1 + c)r

(1 + c r): (50)
From (50), we can see that when 0 < r  1,
c  cr[r   c(1  r)] = c  crr + cr+1(1  r) > 0
since c > crr and cr+1(1  r) > 0. Thus, at s = 0,
dTES
ds
>
dTEP
ds
when 0 < r  1.
When r  1, from (48), at s = 0,
dTEW
ds
=
dTEP
ds
=

1 +
cr + 1  (1 + c)r
cr(1 + c)r

(1 + cr)
> 2

1 +
c+ 1  (1 + c)r
cr(1 + c)r

= 2

crr   (r   1)
crr

:
Thus,
dTEW
ds
=
dTEP
ds
> 1 requires that
2

crr   (r   1)
crr

 1;
i.e., crr  2(r   1). It can be shown that when a pure-strategy equilibrium exists, r  2,
2(r   1)  1 < crr when r  1, nally we have crr  2(r   1).
6.5 Proof of Proposition 3
From (2), we can show that
de1
dc1
=  c
r 2
1 c
r
2[c
r
1(1 + r) + c
r
2(1  r)]rV
(cr1 + c
r
2)
3
;
de2
dc2
=  c
r
1c
r 2
2 [c
r
1(1  r) + cr2(1 + r)]rV
(cr1 + c
r
2)
3
:
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Then
de1
dc1
=
de2
dc2
=
c22[c
r
1(1 + r) + c
r
2(1  r)]
c21[c
r
1(1  r) + cr2(1 + r)]
=
c2[(1 + r) + cr(1  r)]
[(1  r) + cr(1 + r)] : (51)
Thus
d(
de1
dc1
=
de2
dc2
)
dr
=
 2c2(c2r   1 + 2crr log c)
[(1  r) + cr(1 + r)]2 < 0;
From (12) and (51), we derive that at s = 0,
deS1
ds
=
deW2
ds
=
c[(1 + r) + cr(1  r)]
[(1  r) + cr(1 + r)] :
It follows that
deS1
ds
js=0 >;=; < de
W
2
ds
js=0
when
(cr+1   1)(1  r)  (cr   c)(1 + r) >;=; < 0:
Notice that when r <;=; > 1, both (1   r) >;=; < 0 and (cr   c) <;=; > 0, therefore
(cr+1   1)(1  r)  (cr   c)(1 + r) >;=; < 0.
6.6 Proof of Lemma 3
a) In equilibrium, each players e¤ort satises (17). By summing (17) over all players, we
get: Pn
i=1
di
dei
=
Pn
i=1
nP
j 6=i ej
o

ei +
P
j 6=i ej
2 V  Pni=1 ci = 0: (52)
Since Pn
i=1(
P
j 6=i ej) =
Pn
i=1 f(
Pn
i=1 ei)  eig = (n  1)
Pn
i=1 ei; (53)
(52) becomes Pn
i=1
di
dei
=
V (n  1)Pn
i=1 ei
 Pni=1 ci = 0:
It follows that
TE =
Pn
i=1 ei =
V (n  1)Pn
i=1 ci
.
b) For any two players with cp < cq, by using (17) we can write:
dp
dep
=
V (
Pn
i=1 ei   ep)
(
Pn
i=1 ei)
2   cp = 0; (54)
dq
deq
=
V (
Pn
i=1 ei   eq)
(
Pn
i=1 ei)
2   cq = 0: (55)
25
Thus it follows that Pn
i=1 ei   epPn
i=1 ei   eq
=
cp
cq
< 1, (56)
so that ep > eq.
6.7 Proof of Proposition 5 (ii)
If the contest designer adds s to the prize in place of subsidizing the weak player, from (18)
we have
dTEP
ds
=
dTE
dV
=
n  1Pn
i=1 ci
. (57)
If the contest designer subsidizes the weakest player, i.e., player n, then
dTEW
ds
js=0 = dTE
W
dcn
dcn
ds
=
dTEW
dcn

  1
en

. (58)
From (18), we derive
dTEW
dcn
=   n  1
(
Pn
i=1 ci)
2 . (59)
Because player n is the weakest player who exerts the smallest e¤ort among the players who
are willing to enter the contest actively,
en  TE
n
=
n  1
n
Pn
i=1 ci
. (60)
Substituting (59) and (60) into (58), we get
dTEW
ds
js=0  nPn
i=1 ci
>
n  1Pn
i=1 ci
,
i.e., at s = 0,
dTEW
ds
>
dTEP
ds
.
6.8 Proof of Proposition 6
A. We start by assuming that all of s is used on subsidies, i.e., sP = 0. Suppose the optimal
total e¤ort level under this restriction is TE. Consider the dual problem of choosing s1 and
s2 to minimize the total resource used, es = s1 + s2, subject to total e¤ort being TE. This
will lead to the same optimal values for s1 and s2.39
39To be precise, any solution to the dual problem must also be a solution to the primal problem. Since
the entire budget must be used up (see footnote 40 below) it will follow that the solution to the primal is
unique. We use es to represent total resource, which is a endogenous variable in this case, to distinguish it
from s, which we treat as xed.
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Given sP = 0, using (19), (20) and (24),
s1 = c1e
0
1 =
c1(c2  c2)V
(c1 + c2  c1  c2)2 = c1(c2  c2)
TE
2
V
;
s2 = c2e
0
2 =
c2(c1  c1)V
(c1 + c2  c1  c2)2 = c2(c1  c1)
TE
2
V
:
Then es = [c1(c2  c2) + c2(c1  c1)]TE2
V
. (61)
From (24), given that total e¤ort is xed at TE, c1 +c2 must be xed at some c:
c = c1 +c2: (62)
Writing c2 = c c1 and substituting into (61) we have40
es = [c1(c2  c+c1) + (c c1)(c1  c1)]TE2
V
. (63)
The contest designer chooses c1 in (63) to minimize es. Di¤erentiating with respect to c1
yields
(c2   c1   2c+ 4c1)TE
2
V
=: K (c1)
TE
2
V
: (64)
When c  c2 c1
2
, (64) is non-negative since
K (c1)  [c2   c1   2(c2   c1
2
) + 4c1] = 4c1  0;
so, in order to minimize (63), it is optimal to set c1 to its minimal value, i.e., c1 = 0 and
thus c2 = c.
Let s be the corresponding resource when
c2 = c =
c2   c1
2
: (65)
In this case, by (19), (20) and (65), we can derive that
s =
2(c  1)V
(3 + c)2
:
Next, we seek to nd out what the optimal subsidy scheme is when s > s. When
c > c2 c1
2
, it is optimal to set K (c1) = 0, which yields the optimal c1 and c2:
c1 =
1
4
[2c  (c2   c1)] > 0; (66)
c2 =
1
4
[2c+ (c2   c1)] > 0: (67)
40Note the entire budget will be used up as for example holding c1 constant, a small increase in TE
can be obtained by a small increase in c and that (63) implies that this leads to a small increase in total
resource; thus the initial solution could not have been optimal if the budget was not exhausted.
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The following two conditions must be satised:
c01 = c1  c1 =
1
4
[3c1 + c2   2c]  0; (68)
c02 = c2  c2 =
1
4
[3c2 + c1   2c]  0: (69)
When
c2   c1
2
< c  3c1 + c2
2
;
both (68) and (69) hold, so (66) and (67) are the optimal solutions for maximizing total
e¤ort. When c = 3c1+c2
2
, by (24),
TE =
2V
c2   c1 ;
and by (66) and (67), c1 = c1 and c2 = 12(c1 + c2); therefore, using (61) we have
s =
2c1V
(c2   c1) =
2V
(c  1) :
It follows that when s < s < s where
s =
2c1V
(c2   c1) =
2V
(c  1) ;
the two players are subsidized simultaneously.41
Also notice that when s = s, c01 = c1  c1 = 0, which means the strong player will be
fully subsidized in equilibrium.
When s > s, c > 3c1+c2
2
, and K (c1) must be negative as
K (c1) <

c2   c1   2

3c1 + c2
2

+ 4c1

= 4(c1   c1)  0.
In this case in order to minimize (63), it is optimal to set c1 to its maximal value, i.e.,
c1 = c1 and thus c2 = c   c1. When c1 = c1, however, there are multiple equilibria
where the strong player could exert an arbitrarily large e¤ort which makes the total amount
of subsidies exceed s. To avoid this problem, we can simply assume that player 1 puts in
the minimum e¤ort necessary to shut outplayer 2. Alternatively, the contest designer can
approximate the optimum by setting c1 = c1   " where " (> 0) is arbitrarily small, so the
strong player is almost fully subsidized and the weak player exerts arbitrarily little e¤ort.42
41Note that by (66) and (67) we have that when s < s  s, c02   c01 = (c2   c1)=2, so that the di¤erence
of the two playerscosts is halved. In fact when s increases from 0 to s, (c02   c01) decreases from (c2   c1)
to (c2   c1)=2; for s < s < s, (c02   c01) remains unchanged at (c2   c1)=2; when s exceeds s, (c02   c01) is
decreasing in s, but only approaches zero as s!1.
42One might think that when s attains some threshold level, c2 will reach c2, i.e., the two players are
both fully subsidized. However, this cannot happen: (24) implies that TE would go to innity when c2
approaches c2 so the required subsidy would also go to innity.
28
B1. We have shown that if adding to the prize is not allowed, when s  s, it is optimal to
use all the resource s to subsidize the weak player. Now, we seek to show that when adding
to the prize is allowed, the optimal subsidy scheme from Part A (when adding to the prize
is not allowed) still maximizes total e¤ort. We compare the e¤ect of only subsidizing the
weak player to that of subsidizing the weak player and adding to the prize simultaneously.
Suppose resource s2 is used to subsidize the weak player and sP = s   s2 is used to add to
the prize (with s1 = 0). Hence
s2 = c2e
0
2 = c2
c1(V + s  s2)
(c1 + c2  c2)2 : (70)
Solving (70) for c2 yields
c2 =
c1(s+ s2 + V ) + 2c2s2  pc1
p
V + s  s2
p
c1(s+ 3s2 + V ) + 4c2s2
2s2
: (71)
Substituting (71) into (24):
TE =
2s2(s  s2 + V )p
c1
p
s  s2+V +
p
4c2s2 + c1(s+ 3s2 + V )  c1(s  s2 + V )
:
Di¤erentiating with respect to s2 and setting this equal to zero yields the following solution:
s2 =
 
1 + 2c p1 + c (s+ V )
3 + 4c
> 0: (72)
Recall that TE is initially increasing as s2 increases from zero, so s2 = s2 is the point at
which TE is maximized when s2  s2 (as it is the rst turning point).43 Thus, it can be
concluded that when s  s2, i.e.,
s 

1  1p
1 + c

V; (73)
we should spend all resource s on subsidizing the weak player rather than increasing the
prize.
For any c > 1, it can be veried that
s =
2(c  1)V
(3 + c)2
<

1  1p
1 + c

V ,
so when s  s, adding to the prize is dominated by subsidizing the weak player. Therefore,
when adding to the prize is allowed, the optimal subsidy scheme is still subsidizing the weak
player provided s  s.
B2. When s < s < s, recall that the optimal subsidy scheme (ignoring the possibility of
increasing the prize) is to subsidize both players simultaneously. For s in this range, suppose
43So for s < s2 it is optimal to spend all s subsidizing the weak player.
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that the following scheme maximizes total e¤ort: adding resource sP  0 to the prize, so
the new prize is V n := V + sP , and the total resource for subsidies is sn := s   sP . The
corresponding version of (3) and (4) then is:
si = (ci   c0i)e0i; where e0i =
c0jV
n
(c01 + c
0
2)
2
;
i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j. Any choice of (c01; c02) implies unique values for s1, s2, sP and e¤ort levels.
It is more convenient to work directly with (c01; c
0
2):
e0i =
c0j (V + s)
c01 (c
0
1 + c2) + c
0
2 (c
0
2 + c1)
; (74)
si =
c0j (ci   c0i) (V + s)
c01 (c
0
1 + c2) + c
0
2 (c
0
2 + c1)
;
i; j = 1; 2, i 6= j (after manipulation). We consider maximizing total e¤ort e01 + e02 subject
to the constraint that s1 + s2 = sn. Using (74), dene the Lagrangian function
L (c01; c
0
2; ) := e
0
1 + e
0
2 + (s
n   s1   s2).
First order conditions yield:
c0i =
2ci(s
n + V n)  2cjsn +
p
2
4(2sn + V n)
; i = 1; 2, j 6= i; (75)
 =
p
2[(c1 + c2)
2V n   (c2   c1)2sn]  2(c1 + c2)
(c2   c1)2 ; (76)
where
 :=
p
2c1c2(V n)2   (c2   c1)2snV n:
Note that s < s implies 2c1c2(V n)2  (c2  c1)2snV n > 0, since this would be most likely to
fail if sn = s = s; at which point it follows that V n = V and  =
p
2c1c2V 2   (c2   c1)2sV =p
2c1V > 0. Therefore, when sn < s  s, sn will be smaller than s and V n will be bigger
than V , so we always have  > 0.
Suppose that the optimum occurs with sP > 0. Recall that s = 2V=(c   1); here the
prize is increased to V + sP , so in this case s < s implies that s < 2 (V + sP ) =(c  1) and
consequently both c0i > 0 and si > 0, thus nonnegativity constraints are not binding. Then
setting sn = s   sP in the above problem would lead to the optimum outcome and (75)
and (76) must hold. However it is tedious but straightforward to check that for s < s, the
numerator in the right hand side of (76) is positive, so  > 0. This implies that an increase
in sn, i.e., a reduction in sP , would increase e¤ort, contrary to the assumption of optimality.
B3. Finally, consider the case where s  s. In the equilibrium under the optimal subsidy
scheme, the strong player will always be almost fully subsidized and the weak player makes
zero e¤ort in equilibrium. Thus, s = c1e01 = c1TE
0, so TE 0 = s=c1. We will show that
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the optimal subsidy scheme still maximizes total e¤ort when adding to the prize is allowed.
Assume again that to maximize total e¤ort, some resource sP > 0 should be added to the
prize; we establish this will lead to a contradiction, i.e., the optimal sP = 0.
With the optimal sP > 0 xed, when
sn  sn := 2V
n
(c  1) ; TE
0 =
sn
c1
=
s  sP
c1
:
Clearly total e¤ort is increased if sP is reduced, contrary to the assumed optimality. Likewise,
when sn < sn, optimal subsidies imply c0i > 0, i = 1; 2, and the previous argument applies
to show a reduction in sP increases total e¤ort.
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